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The Evolutionary Robustness of Forgivene...
Bó, Pedro Dal...
The Evolutionary Robustness of Forgiveness and Cooperation by Bó, Pedro Dal ( Author )
Australian National University
11-08-2023
We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary process we consider is given by the replicator dynamics. We show that there are strategies with a uniformly large basin of attraction independently of the size of the population. Moreover, we show that those strategies forgive defections and, assuming that they are symmetric, they cooperate.
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Article
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30.00 KB
English
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MYR 0.01
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http://arxiv.org/abs/1205.0958
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