Advanced search

Browse by subject

Browse by provider

Browse by language

Content Details
Normal View
CIP View

Constructive proof of the existence of N...

Tanaka, Yasuhito...

Free

Share this content

Constructive proof of the existence of Nash Equilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally non-constant payoff functions by Sperner's lemma by Tanaka, Yasuhito ( Author )

Content Provider	Lemonjar Open Access
Publisher	N.A
Publication Date	31-07-2023
Summary	Using Sperner's lemma for modified partition of a simplex we will constructively prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally non-constant payoff functions. We follow the Bishop style constructive mathematics.
ISBN	-
Item Type	Article
File Type	pdf
File Size	37.08 KB
Language	English
Subjects	-
Unlimited	MYR 0.01
Total read	-
URL	http://arxiv.org/abs/1103.1980

Citation

Review the full bibliography data and make any necessary corrections before using. Always consult your library resources for the exact formatting and punctuation guidelines.

AMA 11th EditionReferences

Tanaka, Yasuhito. Constructive proof of the existence of Nash Equilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally non-constant payoff functions by Sperner's lemma. N.A. July 31, 2023. Accessed September 20, 2024. https://online.provdatabase.com/cite/2702

APA 7th EditionReferences

Tanaka, Yasuhito. (2023). Constructive proof of the existence of Nash Equilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally non-constant payoff functions by Sperner's lemma. N.A. https://online.provdatabase.com/cite/2702

Chicago 17th EditionReferences

HarvardReferences

Harvard AustraliaReferences

Tanaka, Yasuhito, 2023, Constructive proof of the existence of Nash Equilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally non-constant payoff functions by Sperner's lemma, N.A, viewed 20 September 2024, <https://online.provdatabase.com/cite/2702>

MLA 9th EditionWorks Cited

Tanaka, Yasuhito. Constructive proof of the existence of Nash Equilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally non-constant payoff functions by Sperner's lemma. N.A, 2023. PROV Database, https://online.provdatabase.com/cite/2702.

Share this eBook